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Competition issues in the beef industry can be traced to the late 1880s and stemmed in part from 
market structure changes of an evolving economy. Railroads, improved highways, irrigated grain 
production, and technological changes within meatpacking plants combined over time to alter 
cattle feeding and marketing and the market structure of the U.S. meatpacking industry. Along 
the way, court decisions and Congressional actions altered the regulatory environment. Most 
notably, the Supreme Court issued the Packers’ Consent Decree in 1920 and Congress passed the 
Packers and Stockyards Act of 1921. The Act created the Packers and Stockyards 
Administration, now called the Grain Inspection, Packers and Stockyards Administration 
(GIPSA), within the U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA). 
The consent decree and formation of a regulatory agency in USDA may have reduced 
some of the concerns about beef industry competition for a time, but many of the same 
competition issues surfaced not too many years later. Following a study in the 1930s, Nicholls 
(1940) wrote, “Only after considerable further investigation will we know whether or not reform 
in the packing industry is necessary. It is conceivable that such monopoly elements as exist yield 
desirable results. A less extreme possibility is that results are undesirable but not sufficiently bad 
to bother about.”  
One might trace what could be referred to as the modern era controversy to the late 1960s 
when Iowa Beef Processors began to be a major force in the meatpacking industry. The  
 
technological innovation of boxed beef had a major effect on market structure and economics of 
the meatpacking industry. Since the late-1980s, concentration in meatpacking has been high by 
many economists’ standards, above levels considered by some economists to elicit 
noncompetitive behavior and result in adverse economic performance. 
This article focuses on the period since the 1970s. Its objectives are to: (1) put beef 
packing competition issues in historical perspective, (2) highlight market structure changes in 
beef packing, (3) note some key lawsuits and court rulings that contribute to the regulatory 
environment, and (4) acknowledge the large body of research related to concentration and 
competition issues.  
Structural Changes and Causes 
What led to high levels of concentration in beef packing?  Here is a quick review of structural 
changes which occurred especially in the 1970s and 1980s in the beef packing industry. In 1976, 
there were 145 steer and heifer slaughtering plants with annual slaughter of 50,000 head or more 
(GIPSA, 2008 and previous annual reports). Some meatpacking firms own a single plant and 
some are multiplant firms. Plants with annual slaughter exceeding one-half million steers and 
heifers numbered five and accounted for 14.8% of slaughter by firms in the category of 50,000 
head or more per year. Average slaughter in these largest five plants averaged 666,800 head. 
Comparable data for 2006, the last year data were reported, illustrate major market 
structure changes. The number of plants in the category of 50,000 head or more per year declined 
to 36. Fourteen plants each slaughtered one million or more steers and heifers in 2006. These 14 
plants accounted for 70.2% of total steer and heifer slaughter in the 50,000 head or more size 
group. Average slaughter per plant in the 14 largest plants nearly doubled from 1976 to 
1,302,643 head in 2006. The same trend can be identified for boxed beef processing plants.  
 
Not only did plant size increase, growth and consolidation resulted in larger beef packing 
firms as well, which in turn increased concentration. The four-firm concentration ratio (CR4), the 
combined market share of the four largest firms, is one common measure of how economically 
concentrated an industry or market is. In theory, the higher the CR4, meaning the closer it 
approaches 100%, the greater the likelihood the four largest firms are exercising market power. 
Market power may be either oligopolistic power of a few dominant sellers in the output market 
or oligopsonistic power of a few dominant buyers in the input market, reflecting significant 
influence on the market by a few firms. Economists have debated for years whether or not the 
CR4 is an appropriate or inappropriate measure of market power; but regardless, it continues to 
be a measure of concentration. 
In 1976 for steer and heifer slaughter, the four largest firms accounted for 25.1% of total 
steer and heifer slaughter (a CR4 of 25.1) according to GIPSA data. By 2007, CR4 was 80.0 for 
total steer and heifer slaughter as well as for boxed beef production. However, the four largest 
firms in 1976 were not the same as the four largest firms in 2007 due to several mergers and 
acquisitions.  
The sharp trend toward fewer and larger plants was driven by the enhanced economic 
efficiency and cost management associated with operating larger firms. MacDonald and 
Ollinger, (2005) cite technology combined with a sharp reduction in packer costs as contributing 
factors for consolidation in beef packing. Meatpacking is a margin-driven business. Firms buy 
livestock at a small range around the market average price. Meatpackers do not control the 
market average price; the result of price determination. Meatpackers do not directly control the 
supply of cattle raised and do not directly control demand by consumers for beef products. But 
packers can influence prices paid around that average price level; the result of price discovery.  
 
They subsequently sell meat and byproducts at a small range around the market average 
wholesale price. Again, they do not control the market average wholesale price but can influence 
prices received around that average price level. Thus, gross margins are about the same for all 
firms and the firm with the lowest costs experiences the largest net margin or profit. As a result, 
firms search for ways to control costs. Thus, one of the driving forces in market structure 
changes was the need to be a low-cost slaughterer and processor.  
Studies in the 1960s through the 2000s have found economies of size in cattle 
slaughtering and fabricating, and research confirms firms operate larger beef packing plants in 
order to be competitive (Ward, 2010). As noted by Ward, economies of size findings are quite 
robust across a variety of analytic approaches—economic engineering, simulation, and statistical 
cost analysis—and data—both cross-sectional and time series.  
Similarly, plant utilization significantly affects operating costs. Having a larger plant 
pays dividends in terms of potentially achieving lower costs per head. However, to realize that 
potential advantage over smaller plants, larger plants must operate at high levels of utilization. A 
larger plant at lower utilization rate may in fact have higher costs per unit than a smaller plant 
operated at near-capacity utilization. Research in the 1980s to 2000s also confirms the 
importance of plant utilization and that larger plants operate at higher plant utilization than 
smaller plants (Ward, 2010). Thus, larger plants have lower costs per unit than smaller plants 
both because they are larger and because they are operated at higher utilization.  
Plant operating behavior leads to dynamic structural changes. For example, when a firm 
expands a plant, say from one-half million cattle per year to one million cattle per year, either by 
expanding the plant or operating the plant two shifts per day, the plant experiences lower per-
head operating costs. Importantly also, one-half million cattle previously slaughtered by other  
 
plants are now slaughtered in a single plant unless other factors intervene. Plants losing slaughter 
volume to the larger plant experience higher costs per unit because their plant utilization 
decreases. The result over time is that smaller plants experience higher costs and less profit, go 
out of business, and concentration in meatpacking increases. Again, research has confirmed this 
market structure dynamic.  
Market structure changes since the 1970s, including increased concentration, involved 
both firm consolidation as well as internal growth from capitalizing on plant economies. The 
industry evolved away from the old-line meatpacking firms that were household names for years, 
such as Swift, Armour, Wilson, and, Cudahy to firms like IBP, Excel, and, Swift Independent, 
and later to firms we have today, JBS, Tyson, and Cargill. Thus, concentration also increased 
from mergers and acquisitions involving the largest firms. 
The drive to operate larger, more efficient plants, capitalizing on economies of size, does 
not explain by itself the increase in firm size, such as via mergers and acquisitions. Little 
research is available to determine how many plants a firm needs to capitalize on economies of 
firm size. Advantages are assumed for multiplant firms in procuring livestock for several plants. 
Increasing pressures related to food safety suggest another advantage for multiplant firms and 
examples could be cited where single-plant firms experienced a food-safety crisis that led to the 
firm’s eventual demise. There also may be economies of scope available to firms that handle 
multiple meat species—beef, pork, and poultry—relative to firms that specialize in a single meat. 
Paul (2001) found evidence that larger and more diversified plants in terms of processing 
operations have greater technological economies than smaller plants. 
Pricing Behavior Changes   
 
Another clear trend coincident with increasing concentration is increased packer procurement of 
livestock by non-cash-price means. The first year GIPSA collected data on contracting by the 
four largest beef packing firms (1988), forward contracts and marketing agreements—distinctly 
different but combined by GIPSA for reporting purposes—accounted for 15.8% of steer and 
heifer slaughter and packer ownership of fed cattle accounted for 4.7%. 
Considerably more and better data are available today on packer procurement methods as 
a result of the Livestock Mandatory Reporting Act. Beginning with its implementation in April 
2001, data are now available on weekly prices and volumes of livestock procurement by 
alternative marketing methods (Ward, 2009a, 2009b). 
 Figure 1. Weekly Fed Cattle Pricing Methods by Packers since Mandatory Price Reporting, 2001-2008 
 
Alternative marketing arrangements for fed cattle include negotiated cash trades, negotiated 
grids—which specify prices for a range of  price-quality combinations with the base price 
resulting from buyer-seller negotiation, formula priced trades typically with the base price tied to  
 
a cash market quote or plant average cost, forward contracts typically with price tied to the 
futures market or future market basis, and packer–owned transactions for which no price is 
reported since they are typically internal transfers from one division of the packing firm to 
another.  
The percentage of fed cattle purchased by packers through alternative methods has 
changed as follows over the 2002-2010 period since the new data have been reported. Negotiated 
cash went from 43.8% in 2001-02 to 34.1% in 2009-10; negotiated grid pricing, from 12.4% for 
2004-05 when reporting began to 7.5%; formula agreements, from 48.9% to 43.0%; forward 
contracts, from 3.0% to 10.3%; and packer–owned, from 6.2% to 5.1%. Thus, there has been a 
trend away from the cash market and toward alternative marketing arrangements over the past 
decade. Figure 1 shows the variability in weekly fed cattle procurement by alternative 
procurement methods. 
Figure 2. Comparison of Fed Cattle Prices by Alternative Procurement Methods since Mandatory Price Reporting, 
2001-2008  
 
Just as the extent of packer procurement of livestock by alternative methods is important, 
so is the relationship among prices by alternative methods. Figure 2 shows the weekly prices for 
fed cattle by procurement method. Prices for fed cattle track relatively closely for negotiated 
cash, negotiated grid, and formula agreements but forward contracts do not track the others as 
closely. The mechanics related to each method and the timing of reported prices for forward 
contracts explains many of the differences over time, but not necessarily for any given week 
(Ward, 2008). 
Lawsuits and Regulatory Implications 
While concentration is high in meatpacking, civil antitrust lawsuits filed against the largest 
meatpacking firms have not resulted in major court decisions against those largest firms in the 
past thirty years. And no significant Federal government antitrust cases have been brought 
against the largest meatpacking firms over the same period.  
Civil antitrust lawsuits at three points in time seem relevant. Market power, 
oligopsonistic behavior, and price discovery were issues to some producers in the 1970s even 
though the CR4 in steer and heifer slaughtering was not high by economists’ standards. Two 
class action antitrust lawsuits, referred to as the Meat Price Investigators Association (MPIA) 
case and the Bray case, were filed against (in total) the four largest grocery retailers, four largest 
beef packers, and the leading private market reporting firm. The MPIA case was filed in 1975 
when the CR4 in steer and heifer slaughtering was 25.3. After several years of litigation, both 
cases were dismissed in the early 1980s. 
A different type of lawsuit was filed in 1985 by Monfort of Colorado, then one of the 
largest beef packing firms, against Cargill which was a large competitor. Cargill agreed to 
purchase a competing beefpacker of both firms, Spencer Foods. Monfort deemed the acquisition  
 
anticompetitive both to itself and the industry, but the courts ruled in favor of Cargill and 
allowed the merger to proceed. The Monfort case was filed when CR4 in steer and heifer 
slaughtering was 50.2, and the court’s decision had a quick and lasting impact as it opened the 
door to several mergers and acquisitions involving some of the largest meatpacking firms. In 
1987 alone, the CR4 in steer and heifer slaughter increased by 12 percentage points, from 55.1 to 
67.1. 
By the mid-90s, the CR4 in steer and heifer slaughter had risen to about 80. Cattle 
producers filed a class action lawsuit against IBP in 1996, known initially as the Pickett v IBP 
case, and later called the Pickett v Tyson Fresh Meats case after Tyson purchased IBP in 2001. A 
jury in Federal court ruled in favor of the plaintiffs in 2004 and assessed damages of $1.28 
billion. However, shortly thereafter, the trial judge set aside the jury ruling and entered a 
summary judgment in favor of Tyson which was later upheld by an Appellate court.  
These lawsuits are relevant for two reasons. Figure 3 shows the reported CR4 in steer and 
heifer slaughter and boxed beef production since 1972 based on GIPSA data (GIPSA, 2008). In 
addition, filing dates of the three lawsuits are identified. Note the difference in concentration at 
each time period. Producers and competitors have been concerned about concentration and 
competition for many years, but to date insufficient evidence has been presented to rule in favor 
of those concerns. A reason for this relates to the mixed research results by economists, as noted 
later in this article. While regulatory agencies, notably GIPSA and the Department of Justice 
(DOJ) have been routinely criticized for not halting the trend in concentration, civil lawsuit 
outcomes may have influenced their decisions regarding potential antitrust regulation.   
 
Figure 3. Four-Firm Concentration in Steer and Heifer Slaughter and Boxed Beef Production with Selected Civil 
Antitrust Lawsuits, 1972-2007 
Meatpacking Behavior and Performance Research 
Agricultural economists have conducted considerable research over the past three decades 
related to behavior and performance of livestock and meat markets, with considerable focus on 
the meatpacking industry. Ward (2010) reviewed a number of articles in roughly chronological 
order (see the review at the Department of Justice website 
http://www.justice.gov/atr/public/workshops/ag2010/index.htm#publiccomments ). Research 
varies widely in terms of data—data unit aggregation from individual transactions to annual 
observations, collection length from one month to decades, and spatial aggregation from local 
market to the entire United States—as well as methodological approach, including numerous 
econometric models, simulation, game theory, etc.  
 
An extensive review of competition in meatpacking concluded that the body of empirical 
evidence was insufficient to persuasively argue the meatpacking industry was not competitive 
(Azzam and Anderson, 1996). Sexton (2000) concluded that market power estimates in 
meatpacking are modest and structural changes on balance are probably beneficial from an 
efficiency viewpoint. Any single piece of research has its weaknesses in data and methodological 
approach, suggesting the need to consider the entire body of research.  
Two summary statements can be made from the Ward (2010) review. First, relatively 
consistent research on pre-committed—captive—supplies suggests use of alternative marketing 
arrangements by packers is associated with lower cash market prices for livestock though the 
magnitude of lower prices is quite small. However, research fails to connect this finding to 
abusive use of precommitted supplies. In the most recent Congressionally mandated study, 
economists found cost savings and quality improvement associated with meatpacking firms’ use 
of precommitted supplies, referred to in the study as alternative marketing arrangements, 
outweighed the effect of oligopsony market power (GIPSA Livestock and Meat Marketing 
Study, 2007). 
Second, research on oligopoly/oligopsony power is mixed (Ward, 2010). Game theory 
research provides evidence packer behavior is consistent with a trigger pricing strategy. Where 
market power has been found, whether oligopoly power or oligopsony power, the market power 
magnitude is relatively small in most cases and seemingly within an “acceptable” public policy 
level. But there are exceptions, and at least one study found a larger magnitude which exceeds 
the “acceptable” public policy level. 
Research on price impacts and market power estimates begs the question, “How large is 
large?” or “How small is small?” Price distortions of 3% or less have been found in several  
 
studies. These fall well short of regulatory agency standards related to merger impacts and 
noncompetitive behavior, often assuming a 5% price impact rule (U.S. Department of Justice and 
Federal Trade Commission, 1997). However, the courts and regulatory agencies have not defined 
specifically how much market power is “significant” and for how long a firm or firms must 
maintain significant market power. 
From a different perspective, seemingly small impacts in $/cwt can make a substantial 
difference to livestock producers and rival meatpacking firms operating at the margin of 
remaining viable or being forced to exit an industry. In relatively low-profit businesses, “small” 
degrees of market power can have significant profit implications.  
Major Questions Remain 
A major question relating to market structure changes and increasing concentration is what 
should be done or what can be done to reverse the trend? Some people want to do nothing and 
allow the marketplace to function unencumbered by external regulations and constraints. Other 
people would administratively alter the market structure where problems seemingly occur. For 
example, they would break up large meatpacking firms; and/or restrict presumed problematic 
behavior, such as eliminate contracting and vertical integration which includes packer ownership 
of livestock.  
No definitive answer is attempted here, but a few concluding observations are offered.  
·  From a long historical perspective, names of meatpacking firms change but 
many of the same allegations of meatpacker abuse continue.  
·  Evidence of structural changes is clear. Meatpacking firms have increased 
greatly in size both from internal growth as well as mergers and acquisitions. 
The result has been fewer and larger plants, fewer and larger firms, and much  
 
higher levels of concentration. 
·  Evidence of behavioral changes is clear also. Meatpacking firms no longer 
rely solely on the cash market for livestock purchases. These changes are in 
response to livestock owners’ preferences as well as the need for improved 
coordination and reduced costs to be competitive with rival firms and for beef 
to compete with other meats. 
·  Lastly, research findings do not consistently and convincingly identify serious 
problems, though many studies point to potential problems and raise several 
issues. Determining the need for legislative or regulatory reform is difficult, as 
is identifying what the reform measures should be that would be corrective, 
without being disruptive and injecting unintended, negative consequences 
onto the marketplace. 
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